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Utilitarianism and Wealth Transfer Taxation
Jennifer Bird-Pollan *
This article is the third in a series examining the
continued relevance and philosophical legitimacy of the
United States wealth transfer tax system from within a
particular philosophical perspective. The article examines
the utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill and his philosophical
progeny and distinguishes the philosophical approach of
utilitarianism from contemporary welfare economics,
primarily on the basis of the concept of “utility” in each
approach. After explicating the utilitarian criteria for ethical
action, the article goes on to think through what Mill’s
utilitarianism says about the taxation of wealth and wealth
transfers, the United States federal wealth transfer tax
system as it stands today, and what structural changes
might improve the system under a utilitarian framework.

I. INTRODUCTION
A nation’s tax laws can be seen as its manifested
distributive justice ideals. While it is clear that the United
States’ Tax Code contains a variety of provisions aimed at
particular non-distributive justice goals, 1 underneath the
political rhetoric and backroom deals, our tax and transfer
*

James and Mary Lassiter Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky
College of Law. Thanks for useful comments on the project go to participants in
the National Tax Association meeting, the Loyola Los Angeles Law School Tax
Colloquium, the Tax Roundtable at the Vienna University of Economics and
Business Institute for Austrian and International Tax Law, and the University of
Kentucky College of Law Brown Bag Workshop, as well as Professors Albertina
Antognini, Richard Ausness, Stefan Bird-Pollan, Zach Bray, Jake Brooks, Miranda
Perry Fleischer, Brian Frye, Brian Galle, Michael Healy, Kathy Moore, Katherine
Pratt, Ted Seto, and Andrew Woods. Thank you also to K.B. Alex Nguyen and
other members of the Arkansas Law Review for careful and thoughtful editing.
1. These goals range from the basic goals of revenue raising and the funding
of government projects to incentive goals encouraging such things as the purchase
of business equipment, the provision of employee health insurance by employers,
or the installation of solar panels in residential homes. 26 U.S.C. §§ 25D, 106, 179
(2012).
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systems embody (or should embody) the model of
distributive justice that we as a nation have endorsed. 2
Unfortunately, these ideals often get lost or smothered
under political debates. Even if it were possible to
understand a nation’s fundamental distributive justice
goals, pushing those goals through the political sausagemaking machine makes it difficult to identify the
foundational beliefs in the resulting legislation. 3 One of
the problems of seeing tax law as a manifestation of
distributive justice is that in a nation as large as the United
States, it is difficult to argue that the nation as a whole has
one coherent set of distributive justice beliefs. 4 Indeed, it
would be absurd to make such a claim in 2016, when the
country appears more politically divided than it has ever
been. 5
Because of the political differences among the
contemporary American citizenry, lawmakers ought to
consider any tax policy proposals (indeed, policy
proposals of any kind) from the perspectives of the major
political views endorsed by the citizenry. In an attempt to
contribute to this discussion, this article is the third in a
series that examines the United States’ federal wealth
transfer taxes from the perspective of a particular set of

2. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Equality, Liberty, and a Fair Income Tax, 23
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 608 (1996).
3. There is much written about the complexity of the Code and about the
structural reasons our legislative process often results in such messy rules. One
cynical interpretation of this is that “[i]f Congress were to bind itself to make no
major changes in tax law during the next congressional session—or ever again—
the contributions would start to dry up, these members’ lunch and dinner invitations
would taper off, and so on.” JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A
CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER TAXES 171 (4th ed. 2008).
4. Even when the review of arguments for distributive justice is limited to
academic theories, it remains difficult to articulate a coherent view of the “right”
distributive justice outcome. It is the lack of intellectual coherence on equity
questions that results in the view that equity is less important than efficiency.
James R. Repetti, Democracy and Opportunity: A New Paradigm in Tax Equity, 61
VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1131 (2008).
5. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN THE AMERICAN
PUBLIC: HOW INCREASING IDEOLOGICAL UNIFORMITY AND PARTISAN ANTIPATHY
AFFECT POLITICS, COMPROMISE AND EVERYDAY LIFE 6-7 (2014), http://www.peoplepress.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/
[https://perma.cc/GC45-4JSA].
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beliefs about distributive justice. 6 Distributive justice asks
whether any particular distribution of wealth within a
society is more just than another, or whether justice
demands a redistribution of the current state of wealth
distribution. 7 Thinking about the American citizenry’s
views of distributive justice can inform tax policy decisions
and help legislators draft tax rules that most accurately
reflect the wishes of the population they represent.
Democracy, of course, is meant to elicit the views of a
majority of the citizens, and then enact those views as a
series of laws. 8 However, even if we believed our
democracy did that effectively, it would still mean that,
potentially, a sizable minority of citizens would not
necessarily have their political beliefs reflected in the
nation’s laws.
Because the United States is not comprised entirely
of people who share one set of philosophical beliefs, 9 in
this series of articles I consider some of the most
commonly endorsed philosophical belief systems, and
then examine one important element of the federal tax
system— the wealth transfer taxes—through the lens of
that belief system. My work uses wealth transfer taxes
rather than the income tax to consider the consequences
of those belief systems, both because wealth transfer
taxation is more purely the site of redistribution in the
Code and because the U.S. federal income tax does
significant work beyond redistribution. 10 This combination
6. See Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Unseating Privilege: Rawls, Equality of
Opportunity, and Wealth Transfer Taxation, 59 W AYNE L. REV. 713, 713 (2014)
(proposing that an inheritance or accessions tax best fits the Rawlsian philosophy
of equality of opportunity, which is at the heart of much American thought)
[hereinafter Bird-Pollan, Unseating Privilege]; Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Death, Taxes,
and Property (Rights): Nozick, Libertarianism, and the Estate Tax, 66 ME. L. REV.
1, 1 (2013) (exploring the estate tax from the perspective of Robert Nozick’s
libertarian philosophical viewpoint) [hereinafter Bird-Pollan, Death, Taxes, and
Property].
7. See Bird-Pollan, Death, Taxes, and Property, supra note 6, at 22.
8. See, e.g., Democracy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
9. Indeed, if one examines recent elections within the United States, one
might conclude that philosophical (and political) beliefs are more diametrically
opposed than they have ever been. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 5, at 6.
10. The U.S. federal income tax is the location of significant policy-making in
this country, in addition to being the source of satisfaction of most revenue-raising
goals. Gerald Prante & Scott Hodge, The Distribution of Tax and Spending
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of factors makes the United States federal wealth transfer
tax system a uniquely interesting place to examine the
way in which particular distributive justice ideals, which
seem to be endorsed by the American populace, are (or
are not) manifested in law. A loose form of utilitarianism
(the judgment that the best action is the one that
maximizes overall “utility” to the greatest degree) is an
extremely popular view in contemporary American
politics. 11 Individuals on both sides of the political aisle
make utilitarian arguments in support of their views. 12 In
particular the language of “increasing the pie” appears in
discussions of tax reform and debates about social welfare
programs, regardless of the speakers’ belief about how
that newly expanded pie should be allocated. 13 While
discussions of this growing pie are often Rawlsian in

Policies
in
the
United
States,
TAX
FOUND.,
http://taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/files/docs/SR211.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BVZ4-6N2T]. Through the use of tax expenditure programs (socalled “government spending”), the Code creates incentives for particular behavior.
STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 1, 3 (1985).
Furthermore, the income tax generates the vast majority of federal revenues.
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE 2016 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 53 (2016),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/51580LTBO-2.pdf (providing a long-term budget outlook up to 2046)
[https://perma.cc/GM8F-89FZ]. For these reasons, among others, discussion of
the wealth transfer taxes, rather than the income tax, provides space for a more
explicit examination of the philosophical reasons for taxation. For a more robust
discussion of why this project focuses on wealth transfer taxes rather than on
income taxes, see Bird-Pollan, Death, Taxes, and Property, supra note 6,
especially Part II.
11. See generally Philip Harvey, Human Rights and Economic Policy
Discourse: Taking Economic and Social Rights Seriously, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 363, 406 (2002) (noting that many political conflicts in the United States arise
in part due to “the utility maximizing preferences of a majority of the population.”).
12. See Russell Hardin, The Utilitarian Logic of Liberalism, 97 ETHICS 47, 4849 (1986) (arguing “morally defensible rights” are grounded in utilitarian concepts);
John Lawrence Hill, A Theory of Merit, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 15, 30 (2002)
(asserting that “contemporary thinking on the right is broadly utilitarian in its
commitments”); Michael D. Stark, Millian Republicans v. Benthamian Democrats
(November 12, 2012), https://michaeldstark.wordpress.com/2012/11/12/millianrepublicans-v-benthamian-democrats/ [https://perma.cc/6NAZ-5YDL].
13. In an editorial discussion of tax reform, former FDIC chairwoman Sheila
Bair (a self-proclaimed conservative Republican) described the Republicans as “a
party that prides itself on increasing the pie, not redividing it.” Sheila C. Blair,
Grand Old Parity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2013, at A25.
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nature, 14 there is a distinctly utilitarian bent to such
discussions as well, since more pie means more utility,
making choices that produce more value for more people
the appropriate choices under a utilitarian model. 15 This
utilitarian language, manifested primarily in twenty-first
century debates as the language of economics, exercises
significant
authority
in
contemporary
political
discussions. 16
In this article, I take up classical
utilitarianism, in particular as articulated by John Stuart
Mill, and apply it to an analysis of the United States’
wealth transfer tax regime.
Utilitarianism has been adopted and transformed in
contemporary political theory into welfare economics. 17 In
this article, I will demonstrate why a consideration of
classical utilitarianism, in its most philosophically rigorous
manifestation, can offer something beyond the traditional
welfare economics arguments. Further, I will show that
Mill’s utilitarianism is consistent with a robust, heavily
redistributive, wealth transfer tax system. This article
should not be taken as an endorsement of the utilitarian
position. Rather, I explicate classical utilitarianism and
then adopt it for purposes of the article in order to apply its
precepts to an examination of the taxation of wealth
transfers.
The structure of the article proceeds as follows: Part I
introduces the problem and the structure of the article.
Part II explains the history and current state of wealth
transfer taxation in the United States. Part III articulates
the classical utilitarian ethical theory, its adaptation into
the theory of welfare economics, and the important
distinctions between the two approaches. Part IV applies

14.
Jason
Brennan,
Rawl’s
Distributive
Justice,
https://www.libertarianism.org/guides/lectures/rawlss-distributive-justice
[https://perma.cc/4YTA-9ZXL] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
15. See, e.g., Thomas D. Griffith, Progressive Taxation and Happiness, 45
B.C. L. REV. 1363, 1366 (2004) (assuming that “improving aggregate social
welfare, as measured by the individual utility levels or happiness of the population,
remains one important goal of tax policy.”).
16. See Miranda Perry Fleischer, Charitable Giving and Utilitarianism:
Problems and Priorities, 89 IND. L.J. 1485, 1487 n.8 (2014).
17. For a further discussion of this claim, see infra note 60.
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classical utilitarianism to an evaluation of the taxation of
wealth transfers. Part V concludes.

II. THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL WEALTH
TRANSFER TAX SYSTEM
A. History of the System
The United States wealth transfer tax system has
three elements: the estate tax, the gift tax, and the
generation-skipping transfer (GST) tax. 18 In place since
1916, the estate tax is the central component of the
system and imposes an excise tax on the transfer of
wealth at death. 19 The federal gift tax serves as a
backstop to the estate tax, ensuring that wealth
transferred during the donor’s lifetime, rather than held
until death, will also be subjected to the imposition of the
tax. 20 The GST tax imposes another layer of tax on
18. Joint Committee on Taxation, History, Present Law, and Analysis of the
Federal
Wealth
Transfer
System
(March
18,
2015),
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4744,
at
1-3
[https://perma.cc/U5V6-LJLR]. The federal estate tax (a tax on transfers made to
surviving heirs at the death of the donor) was first enacted in the United States in
1916. Id. at 5. The first estate tax was enacted without an accompanying gift tax.
Id. at 6. As a result, the tax could easily be avoided if the donor transferred the
majority of her assets tax-free during her lifetime, rather than waiting until death to
pass on her wealth. Id. at 5. Congress realized that the estate tax was nearly
powerless without a gift tax, and, as a result, the first gift tax (a tax on gratuitous
transfers made during the donor’s lifetime) was enacted in 1924 but repealed in
1926. Id. at 6. The modern gift tax was enacted in 1932, and the United States
has had both gift and estate taxes since then, with the exception of the one-year
repeal of the estate tax in 2010. Id. at 6, 10. The GST tax, imposed to ensure that
wealth transfer taxation cannot be avoided by making a transfer to an heir who is
not an immediate descendant of the transferor, was first enacted in 1976 and has
been in place in its current form since 1986. Darien B. Jacobson, Brian G. Raub &
Barry W. Johnson, The Estate Tax: Ninety Years and Counting, 118, 118-24
(2007), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/ninetyestate.pdf [https://perma.cc/36HRE2WE].
19. Id. at 118. The estate tax is imposed at a current rate of forty percent on
amounts in excess of the 2014 unified credit exemption equivalent amount of
$5,340,000. 26 U.S.C. §§ 2001, 2010 (2012); Joint Committee on Taxation, supra
note 18, at 12.
20. 26 U.S.C. § 2501 (2012). The Code imposes an excise tax on the
gratuitous transfer of wealth during the donor’s lifetime if the transfer exceeds the
lifetime unified credit exemption equivalent amount of $5,340,000.
Joint
Committee on Taxation, supra note 18, at 12. The gift tax is statutorily linked to
the estate tax, so the tax is imposed at the rate of forty percent in 2014. 26 U.S.C.
§ 2001.
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gratuitous transfers (either during lifetime or after death)
made to recipients more than one generation removed
from the donor. 21
The year 2016 marks the 100th anniversary of the
estate tax. Tracing the history of the tax demonstrates a
remarkable shrinking of the tax over time. 22 Throughout
their history, the wealth transfer taxes have been
assessed against varying percentages of the population.
At their peak in 1976, eight percent of adult deaths
resulted in estates that were subject to the estate tax. 23 In
2011 an estimated 0.13% of adult deaths resulted in
estates that were subject to the tax. 24 In terms of total tax
revenues collected through the wealth transfer taxes, the
taxes were at their peak in 1972, when 2.6% of total tax
revenues came from the estate and gift taxes. 25 By
contrast, in 2013 estate tax revenues represented only
0.6% of total United States federal tax revenues. 26

B. Mechanics of the United States Wealth Transfer
Taxes
The modern estate tax is an excise tax on the transfer
of wealth. 27 Many (although perhaps not all) of the
fundamental goals of wealth transfer taxation could be
21. The Code imposes a tax (in addition to taxes imposed under § 2001 and
§ 2501) on direct transfers or distributions from a trust to a “skip person.” 26
U.S.C. § 2601 (2012). In addition to the unified credit against estate and gift taxes
available under § 2010, there is a lifetime credit against the GST tax equivalent to
an exemption amount, in 2014, of $5,340,000. 26 U.S.C. § 2631 (2012)
(referencing § 2010); Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 18, at 12.
Transfers in excess of the exemption equivalent amount are taxed at forty percent
in 2014. 26 U.S.C. § 2602 (2012) (referencing § 2001).
22. See Jacobson, Raub & Johnson, supra note 18, at 121-28.
23. Id. at 125.
24. In 2011, only 0.13% of adult deaths resulted in estates that were subject
to the estate tax. Historical Returns as Percentage of Deaths, TAX POL’Y CTR.,
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/historical-returns-percentage-deaths
[https://perma.cc/8G5L-B3K3].
25. Jacobson, Raub & Johnson, supra note 18, at 125.
26. CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: WHERE DO
FEDERAL
REVENUES
COME
FROM?
2
(2015),
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/PolicyBasics_WhereDoFederalT
axRevsComeFrom_08-20-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JYR-BBVY].
27. “A tax is hereby imposed on the transfer of the taxable estate of every
decedent who is a citizen or resident of the United States.” 26 U.S.C. § 2001(a)
(2012) (emphasis added).
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achieved through the imposition of a direct tax on the
wealth of an individual. 28 Such a tax, operating like the
relatively common property taxes in place in many local
tax jurisdictions, could levy a tax on the current value of an
individual’s assets.
A federal wealth tax could be
assessed annually or more or less frequently; it could be
either flat or graduated; it could be a tax on all holdings or
only those above a certain exemption amount; and it could
be uniform across households or vary based on age or
family size. While the many options for imposing a wealth
tax might make it seem an attractive option, a
constitutional prohibition on direct taxes that are not
proportional makes a wealth tax impossible without a
constitutional amendment in the United States. 29
However, the structure of the estate tax, as an indirect tax
on the act of transferring wealth, rather than a direct tax on
the holding of wealth, is permitted under the United States’
constitutional regime. 30 Current law unifies the estate and
gift tax so that tax is also imposed on so-called “lifetime
transfers.” Wealth transfers are taxed in the same way
whether they occur before or after the death of the
transferor. 31 In practice, the estate, gift, and GST taxes
28. Beverly Moran, Wealth Redistribution and the Income Tax, 53 HOW . L.J.
319, 330 (2010).
29. Id. at 330. For a discussion of the possibility of a wealth tax, and
specifically exploring the use of a wealth tax as a means of funding reparations,
see, e.g., id. at 330-35; David Shakow & Reed Shuldiner, A Comprehensive
Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 499 (2000) (proposing a wealth tax system).
30. “The framing of the tax has constitutional significance: While Congress
may impose excise taxes subject only to the uniformity requirement, any direct tax
on property must be apportioned among the States. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl.
1 & § 9, cl. 4. By imposing the tax on the value of the taxable estate that is
transferred by reason of the decedent’s death (as opposed to the value of the
property in the decedent’s hands just prior to his death), the estate tax falls
comfortably within the excise category.” BRANT J. HELLWIG & ROBERT T.
DANFORTH, ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 1 (2d ed. 2013).
31. While the structure of the gift tax and the estate tax is the same, there is,
in fact, still a benefit to transferring assets during one’s lifetime, due to the taxexclusive nature of the gift tax. The estate tax is assessed on the value of the
assets held by the decedent at death. 26 U.S.C. § 2001 (2012). By its very
nature, then, the estate tax is “tax-inclusive,” meaning that the amount paid in tax
will, itself, be subject to the tax. By contrast, the gift tax is a tax on the amount
transferred by gift. 26 U.S.C. § 2501 (2012). Therefore, the amount subject to the
gift tax does not include the amount of the tax. For example, assume a unified
estate and gift tax rate of fifty percent. Making a post-tax transfer of $100,000 will
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are all imposed at a flat rate of forty percent, although the
statute imposing the tax actually includes a graduated rate
structure. 32 Because of the lifetime exemption equivalent
credit, no transfers are taxed at any rate under the highest
forty percent rate. All transfers within the lower brackets
are exempted from the tax. 33 Under 2016 law, a taxpayer
can transfer a total of $5.45 million tax-free during her
lifetime. 34 The current lifetime credit can also be shared
between spouses, meaning that all married couples are
entitled to a total amount of $10.9 million of tax-free
transfers. 35
The current form of the wealth transfer tax (with a
$5.45 million lifetime exemption, indexed for inflation, and
a forty-percent tax rate on transfers over that amount)
arose as the result of a political compromise in the first
days of 2013. 36 Legislation passed under President
require $200,000 of assets if the amount is transferred after death ($200,000 of
assets x fifty percent tax rate results in $100,000 tax liability, leaving $100,000 of
assets for the heir), while making an inter vivos transfer of $100,000 requires only
$150,000 of assets ($100,000 gift transfer x fifty percent tax on transfer incurs
$50,000 tax liability – total amount required to make the transfer is $150,000). In
that sense, inter vivos gifts are “cheaper” to make than post-death transfers.
32. 26 U.S.C. § 2001 (2012) begins with a tax rate 18% on the first $10,000
transferred, and gradually climbs to the current maximum rate of 40%. However,
as the current exemption equivalent credit of $5.45 million well exceeds the bottom
of the 40% bracket (currently the 40% bracket affects transfers in excess of
$1,000,000), no transfers are subject to the tax rates in the lower brackets.
33. Id.
34. 26 U.S.C. § 2010 (2012); Rev. Proc. 2015-33, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615.
35. Rev. Proc. 2015-33, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615. Beginning with the 2011 tax
year, the Code permitted unused portions of the lifetime credit to transfer to the
surviving spouse upon the death of the first spouse. Joint Committee on Taxation,
supra note 18, at 11. Before then, a significant amount of estate planning, in
particular the use of so-called “QTIP trusts” centered on ensuring that the entirety
of an individual’s unified credit was used up, rather than allowing a portion of it to
expire while the surviving spouse held assets in excess of the unified credit
amount. 26 U.S.C. § 2010 (2012). See also HELLWIG & DANFORTH, supra note 30,
at 354-56, 374.
36. Congress and President Obama signed the American Taxpayer Relief
Act (ATRA) to avoid going over the so-called “fiscal cliff.” CCH Tax Briefing,
President Signs Eleventh-Hour Agreement to Avert Fiscal Cliff (January 3, 2013),
http://tax.cchgroup.com/downloads/files/pdfs/legislation/ATPR.pdf. The agreement
was reached in the final hours of 2012, and the bill was signed into law on January
2, 2013. Colleen Curtis, What You Need to Know about the Bipartisan Tax
Agreement (January 2, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/01/01/whatyou-need-know-about-bipartisan-tax-agreement
[https://perma.cc/9RCM-9EET].
The law sets the estate tax lifetime exemption-equivalent credit at $5 million,
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George W. Bush in 2001 phased out the estate tax with a
full repeal scheduled for 2010. 37 Because the legislation
did not garner the requisite number of votes in Congress
to become permanent, all of the so-called “Bush tax cuts”
were sunset provisions, meaning they would disappear
from the Code on December 31, 2010 without further
legislative action. 38 President Obama and the 2010
Congress enacted legislation on December 17, 2010;
however, the legislation was merely a patch, and that
legislation expired on December 31, 2012. 39 Finally, on
January 2, 2013, the American Taxpayer Relief Act
(ATRA) was enacted, making changes to the wealth
transfer taxes permanent and resulting in the tax rate and
exemption amount in place today. 40
adjusted annually for inflation (which brings it to $5.34 million in 2014) and sets the
tax rate at a flat forty percent for amounts in excess of that amount. 26 U.S.C. §§
2001, 2010 (2012). The new law does not have a sunset date, and thus will not
have to be extended by another Congressional vote.
37. Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 18, at 10. Before President
Bush and the 2001 Congress passed the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), the Code provided a lifetime credit against
tax of $675,000. 26 U.S.C. § 2010(b) (2012). Any transfers made, whether inter
vivos or after death, that exceeded the credit amount were taxed at fifty-five
percent. 26 U.S.C. § 2001 (2012). EGTRRA slowly increased the lifetime credit
amount and simultaneously lowered the rate, culminating in a one-year repeal of
the estate tax in 2010. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ECONOMIC AND BUDGET ISSUE
BRIEF: FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 1 (2009) [hereinafter GIFT TAXES].
38. The peculiarities of EGTRRA resulted in a complete sunset of the law on
December 31, 2010. 2 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGET OPTIONS 239 (2009)
[hereinafter BUDGET OPTIONS].
39. Id.
Congress and President Obama signed the Tax Relief,
Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (the Tax
Relief Act), a two-year extension of the EGTRRA provisions, including a
reinstitution of the estate tax with a $5 million lifetime credit (indexed for inflation)
and a thirty-five percent rate on amounts transferred above the credit amount.
Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 18, at 10-11. That extension expired on
December 31, 2012, at which point the estate and gift tax credit and rate were
scheduled to revert to 2001 levels. BUDGET OPTIONS, supra note 38. The
Congressional Budget Office estimated that extending the EGTRRA estate and gift
tax provisions that lowered the transfer tax rate and increased the lifetime credit
amount would have cost approximately $402 billion over the period of 2010 to
2019, as compared with the revenue that would have been raised if EGTRRA had
been allowed to expire. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN UPDATE TO THE BUDGET AND
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2012 TO 2022 34 (2012); BUDGET OPTIONS,
supra note 38, at 239-40. Leaving the 2009 rates and exemption levels in place
would have raised a total of $420 billion (or 1.2% of total revenues) from 2010 to
2019. See GIFT TAXES, supra note 37, at 5.
40. HELLWIG & DANFORTH, supra note 30, at 17-18.
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In addition to amounts that are transferred as “gifts”
within the definition of the Code, 41 taxpayers can annually
transfer up to a specific amount outside of the definition of
gift, under the annual exclusion amount. 42 In 2016, a
taxpayer can transfer up to $14,000 per recipient with no
obligation to report the transfer on any tax return or pay
gift tax on the transfer. 43 Such a transfer does not use up
any of the individual’s lifetime unified credit, since amounts
under the annual exclusion fall outside of the Code’s
definition of “taxable gift.” 44 In addition, transferors can
pay the tuition and medical expenses of any individual
without subjecting those payments to wealth transfer
taxation, as long as the payments are made directly to the
provider of the services. 45 The annual exclusion was
originally intended as a simplifying mechanism, allowing
“normal” family transfers (gifts on holidays and birthdays,
vacations, even a teenager’s first car) to pass outside of
the transfer tax regime. However, aggressive estate
planning has resulted in the use of the annual exclusion
for significant cash transfers, including in the popular
Crummey Trust context. 46 One suspects, however, that

41. Importantly, and to the chagrin of law students everywhere, the term “gift”
means something different in the gift tax regime than it does in the income tax
regime. The income tax definition of gift, resulting in an increase in wealth to the
recipient that is excluded from the recipient’s income under 26 U.S.C. § 102,
comes from the famous Supreme Court case Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278
(1960). The Supreme Court articulated the standard, still prevalent today, that a
gift stems from “detached and disinterested generosity” on the part of the donor.
Id. at 285. By contrast, the gift tax has a statutory definition of the term “gift” that
does not investigate the donor’s motives. “Where property is transferred for less
than an adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth, then the
amount by which the value of the property exceeded the value of the consideration
shall be deemed a gift . . . .” 26 U.S.C. § 2512(b) (2012).
42. 26 U.S.C. § 2503(b)(1) (2012).
43. 26 U.S.C. § 2503(b)(2) (2012); Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615.
44. 26 U.S.C. § 2503(a)-(b) (2012).
45. 26 U.S.C. § 2503(e) (2012). For a critique of the exclusion of transfers to
pay for health care and education under § 2503, see Kerry A. Ryan, Human
Capital and Transfer Taxation, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 223, 227-29 (2010).
46. Crummey trusts, named for the first taxpayer to successfully defend the
use of this tax strategy in court, allow a contribution to a trust to qualify for the
annual exclusion, as long as the transfer satisfies certain technical requirements,
used to make the transfer more like a current transfer. For an explanation of the
mechanics and uses of Crummey trusts, see Kent A. Mason, An Analysis of
Crummey and the Annual Exclusion, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 573, 577-92 (1982).
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parents using Crummey Trusts and other planning
techniques to transfer $14,000 per year to each of their
children are likely making those traditional “gifts” as well. 47
Transfers like these would violate both the intention and
the letter of the law. 48 The combination of all of these
provisions allows taxpayers to transfer a significant
amount of wealth without paying any wealth transfer taxes,
or using up any of the lifetime credit. 49
While the wealth transfer taxes are collecting less in
revenue now than they did in prior years, 50 at least in part
because the tax rates on these transfers have been
reduced 51 and the exemption amount has been
increased, 52 the reduction in the collection of revenues
can also be attributed, at least in part, to a non-statutory
change. Aggressive estate planning strategies have
reduced the base of the tax by reducing the value of
wealth held by taxpayers. 53 Through the use of entities
such as family limited partnerships, taxpayers reduce the
47. Id. at 604; Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615.
48. Mason, supra note 46, at 604.
49. A married taxpayer with two children could transfer to her children up to
$56,000 per year outside of the transfer tax regime, by transferring $28,000 to
each child and then making an election to have half of the amount treated as being
transferred from the taxpayer’s spouse. On top of that, daycare costs, private
school tuition, university tuition and fees and all medical expenses can be paid
without reporting any of these amounts on a gift tax return. Frequently Asked
Questions
on
Gift
Taxes,
INTERNAL
REVENUE
SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/frequently-askedquestions-on-gift-taxes [https://perma.cc/4GQN-VGZ9].
50. CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, supra note 26.
51. In the year 2001, the estate tax was assessed at a flat rate of fifty-five
percent. Federal Estate and Gift Tax Rates, Exemptions, and Exclusions, 19162014, TAX FOUND. (Feb. 4, 2014) [hereinafter Federal Estate and Gift Tax Rates],
http://taxfoundation.org/article/federal-estate-and-gift-tax-rates-exemptions-andexclusions-1916-2014 [https://perma.cc/9AN4-ZL7Z]. In 2016, it is only forty
percent. 26 U.S.C. § 2001(c) (2012).
52. In the year 2001, the unified credit provided an exemption equivalent
amount of $675,000. Federal Estate and Gift Tax Rates, supra note 51. In 2016,
that amount is $5.45 million. 26 U.S.C. § 2010 (2012); Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 201544 I.R.B. 615. This exponential increase in the size of the exemption amount has
taken a significant number of estates out of the pool of estates subject to the
estate tax. Ten Facts You Should Know About the Federal Estate Tax, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.cbpp.org/research/federaltax/ten-facts-you-should-know-about-the-federal-estate-tax
[https://perma.cc/PG7E-NM6Q].
53. Brant J. Hellwig, On Discounted Partnership Interests and Adequate
Consideration, 28 VA. TAX REV. 531, 536-37 (2009).
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value for estate tax purposes of the assets held in their
estates, and since tax liability is a product of base times
rate, the reduction in the value of the estate (the tax base)
results in a reduction in overall tax liability. 54 The United
States Tax Court has been relatively sympathetic to
taxpayers using aggressive estate planning strategies,
which has resulted in a dramatic decrease in estate tax
revenue. 55
Given the significant evolution of the wealth transfer
tax regime in the past fifteen years, it is at best unclear
what the future of the taxation of wealth transfers in the
United States will look like. While the current legislation
will not expire without action by Congress, there is a vocal
contingent of opponents to the estate tax who fight against
its continued existence. 56 The rhetoric of the “death tax”
and the misconception that the estate tax is the end of
small business and family farms in the United States
54. A Family Limited Partnership (FLP) works by reducing the valuation of
the assets in an estate by placing those assets in a partnership and then imposing
restrictions on the partnership interests. Hellwig, supra note 53, at 535. Typically,
the owner of the assets creates a partnership, places the assets in question inside
the trust, and then imposes restrictions on the voting rights or transferability of the
interests in that partnership. Id. The creator of the partnership then transfers
those partnership interests to family members either during the transferor’s
lifetime, or includes an estate plan that will transfer the partnership interests after
the transferor’s death. Id. Because of the restrictions placed on the partnership
interests, the transferor claims that the value of the partnership interest should be
less than the value of the proportionate share of the underlying assets. Id. at 577.
In many instances the assets included in the FLP are readily marketable assets
such as publicly traded securities. Id. at 543. However, since the assets are
owned by a partnership and there are restrictions on the partnership interests, the
discounted valuation is generally accepted by the I.R.S. Hellwig, supra note 53, at
533 n.2. “Because property is valued on an objective basis for estate and gift tax
purposes, the contribution of property capable of ready valuation to a partnership
followed by the transfer of beneficial interests in the entity serves to suppress
transfer tax value on two independent grounds. First, the partnership interest may
be discounted to reflect its lack of marketability . . . . Second, a transferee of a
limited partnership interest is not entitled to participate in management decisions.”
Id. at 535-36. Discounts can be significant, sometimes nearing thirty percent. Id.
at 536.
55. Id. at 542-44.
56. For a robust analysis of the political campaign aimed at eliminating the
estate tax completely, and potentially using the elimination of the estate tax as a
first step towards the large-scale reduction of federal taxation generally, see
generally MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE
FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH (2005) (presenting the saga of the fight
over the death tax).
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continues to make the estate tax unpopular, even among
individuals who would never be subject to the tax. 57
Despite this opposition, some scholars (perhaps overly
cynically) argue that, as a political matter, the estate tax
will never be eliminated, as politicians who collect
contributions from estate tax opponents are unwilling to
sacrifice the issue completely. 58 However, there is little
evidence that the estate tax is, in fact, inconsistent with
the political and philosophical beliefs of most Americans.
In reality, it seems the opposite is true. 59 Part of the work
of this article and the others in this series is to
demonstrate that the continued existence of wealth
transfer taxation in some form is both philosophically
important and consistent with the beliefs of most
Americans.
57. See Zachary Mider, The Estate Tax: U.S. Rich Follow Rockefeller’s Lead
in Hunt for Loopholes, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/theestate-tax [https://perma.cc/M7XS-WAKK] (last updated Aug. 8, 2016); Paul
Waldman, The Oddly Unpopular Estate Tax, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Dec. 16,
2010),
http://prospect.org/article/oddly-unpopular-estate-tax
[https://perma.cc/S9WC-TEGW].
58. “The secret is not that special interests give boatloads of money to
politicians . . . . The dirty little secret I come to lay bare is that Congress likes it this
way. Congress wants there to be special interests, small groups with high stakes
in what it does or does not do. These are necessary conditions for Congress to
get what it needs: money, for itself and its campaigns . . . . For the estate tax,
there are two opposing sides [to the shakedown game]. The repeal of the tax
would be a good outcome for the wealthy families in the tax’s target range and a
bad outcome for the financiers and others who benefit, big time, from the very
existence of the tax and the planning it pushes many wealthy people to do. No
matter what Congress does, at least two sets of players – billionaire families on the
one hand and their estate-planning advisers and financial institutions on the other
– will always be willing to play because of the estate tax’s high stakes.” Edward J.
McCaffery, The Dirty Little Secret of (Estate) Tax Reform, 65 STAN. L. REV. 21, 21,
23 (2012).
59. “Given how clearly the estate tax lines up with American notions of
fairness, it should enjoy wider support. The beauty of a free-market system is the
absence of a special elite that judges who gets what – consumers vote with their
dollars for the goods and services that best fit their needs (at least in theory).
Inherited wealth goes against this model: As Warren Buffet has said, ‘The idea
that you get a lifetime of privately funded food stamps based on coming out of the
right womb strikes at my idea of fairness.’ Indeed, it’s surprising that many of the
same people who oppose welfare on the grounds that its benefits are not tied to
work can so stridently denounce estate taxes, thus endorsing a system that allows
people to receive vast amounts of money without putting in any work.” Stephen
Martin, America’s Un-American Resistance to the Estate Tax, THE ATLANTIC (Feb.
23, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/02/resistance-estatetax/470403/ [https://perma.cc/77K3-RVHA].
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III. WHAT IS UTILITARIANISM?
The language of welfare economics often dominates
modern day tax policy discussions. 60 Stemming from the
work of Adam Smith, through Ricardo and Musgrave,
among others, and articulated in contemporary
discussions by Louis Kaplow and others, welfare
economics arguments have a distinctly utilitarian bent. 61
Much has been written by welfare economists about the
estate tax and wealth transfer taxes, as well as about tax
policy more generally. 62 If utilitarianism were nothing
more than welfare economics, this article would not be
adding significantly to the conversation. However, welfare
economics has focused on a particular aspect of
utilitarianism, and has left behind some of the unique
elements of the theory that contributed to the evolution of
the ethical debate in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. 63 In this Part, I will explicate the original theory
of utilitarianism as proposed first by Jeremy Bentham and
then endorsed by John Stuart Mill, including in his treatise
of the same name. I will then identify how utilitarianism is
distinct from welfare economics, and how it has evolved in
the nearly 150 years since Mill’s book was published.

A. Classical Utilitarianism
60. Jon Bakija, Social Welfare, Income Inequality, and Tax Progressivity: A
Primer
on
Modern
Economic
Theory
and
Evidence,
http://web.williams.edu/Economics/bakija/BakijaSocialWelfareIncomeInequalityAnd
TaxProgressivity.pdf (noting that optimal income taxation in the economic literature
is focused on addressing the question of how to maximize social welfare)
[https://perma.cc/3LSP-UUH5]. “The classical economists, especially the three
most famous of them, Adam Smith, Malthus and Ricardo, were utilitarians.” JOHN
PLAMENATZ, THE ENGLISH UTILITARIANS 111 (1949).
61. Much of the discussion in contemporary tax policy begins from utilitarian
premises, even when those premises go unacknowledged. See Fleischer, supra
text accompanying note 16; Linda Sugin, A Philosophical Objection to the Optimal
Tax Model, 64 TAX L. REV. 229, 230 (2011).
62. See generally LOUIS KAPLOW , THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC
ECONOMICS (2008) (presenting a unified framework for evaluating and analyzing
taxation).
63. See generally The History of Utilitarianism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHIL.,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-history/
[https://perma.cc/RN6Y-46UC] (last updated Sept. 22, 2014) (providing a history of
Utilitarianism, starting with Bentham and Mill to the modern day refinements of the
philosophy).
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Versions of the utilitarian ethical theory date as far
back as Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus. 64 The unifying
characteristic of utilitarian theories is the idea that, rather
than make a priori claims about the rightness or
wrongness of any particular action, ethical evaluations
should be consequentialist. 65
That is to say, for
utilitarians, ethics is primarily a process of examining the
outcomes (usually the expected outcomes, rather than the
actual outcomes, since ethical decisions must be made in
advance of knowing the actual outcome of the choice) of
actions and determining whether those outcomes tend
towards the goal of the ethical theory. 66
On a
consequentialist model, actions cannot be evaluated in the
abstract, and actions should not be evaluated based on
the motivations behind them. 67 Rather, what makes an
action “right” for a consequentialist, as an ethical matter, is
the degree to which that action achieves the desired

64. “Though Bentham is usually cited as the founder of utilitarianism, the
antecedents of utilitarian principles have a far older vintage in the philosophy of
Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus, and in early Christian thought. Other significant
dimensions of the theory can be traced to the seventeenth-century writings of
Hobbes, Locke, and Richard Cumberland.” JAMES E. CRIMMINS, ON BENTHAM 2-3
(2004).
65. “Utilitarianism is often described as a consequentialist theory . . . A nonconsequentialist theory, such as Kantian ethics, will claim that certain actions are
just wrong in themselves, and not wrong because of their consequences for
happiness or anything else. But consequentialist theories make the rightness of
actions depend on their consequences. Kantian ethics may claim that murder is
wrong in itself, while utilitarianism will claim that it is wrong only because of its
consequences (the decrease in overall happiness brought about by the absence of
the person killed, by the grief, distress, anxiety caused to others, and so on).”
Roger Crisp, Introduction to J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM 14 (Roger Crisp ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 1998) (1861).
66. Utilitarianism is not the only consequentialist theory, but it may be the
best known. Other examples of consequentialism include pragmatism, hedonism,
and
egoism.
Consequentialism,
ETHICS
GUIDE,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/introduction/consequentialism_1.shtml;
Consequentialism,
STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
PHIL.,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/ [https://perma.cc/2CLV-5GPK]
(last updated Oct. 22, 2015). There is some debate about how broadly or narrowly
to define consequentialism, but there is at least general agreement about one
central element of all consequentialist theories. “Any consequentialist theory must
accept the claim that . . . certain normative properties depend only on
consequences. If that claim is dropped, the theory ceases to be consequentialist.”
Id.
67. Id.
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ethical end. 68 The utilitarian version of consequentialism
evaluates the rightness and wrongness of actions by the
degree to which those actions increase utility. 69

1. Jeremy Bentham
In many ways, although John Stuart Mill is its most
famous advocate, Jeremy Bentham is thought of as the
father of utilitarianism. 70 And, at least at the beginning of
his philosophical career, Mill saw himself as extending and
building on the work of Jeremy Bentham, a friend of Mill’s
father, and something of a mentor to Mill himself. 71 A
social revolutionary, Bentham believed that measuring the
good in terms of human happiness was not only more
scientifically accurate than references to idealist criteria,
but also that appeals to happiness would democratize
society. 72
The targets of his philosophical critique
included, to a certain extent, idealists like Immanuel Kant,
but also, to a greater extent, the traditional values
espoused by most religious thinkers. 73 In this regard,
Bentham is the philosophical heir to David Hume’s
empiricism. 74
Like most consequentialist thinkers,
Bentham believed that ethical analyses begin with facts

68. Id.
69. At the heart of debates among those who hold utilitarian ethical beliefs is
the definition of “utility.” The History of Utilitarianism , supra note 63. Section A of
this Part of the article explores what Mill meant by utility. Section B examines the
form “utility” takes in the language of welfare economists. Finally, Section C
highlights the differences between these two approaches.
70. Kiran Bhardwaj, Higher and Lower Pleasures and our Moral Psychology,
1 RES COGITANS 126, 126 (2010).
71. “Mill saw himself as an advocate, and evangelist even, for utilitarianism,
telling us later that he never gave up the greatest happiness principle . . . One of
his first moves was to establish a group of fellow sympathizers, which met in a
disused room at Bentham’s house.” ROGER CRISP, MILL ON UTILITARIANISM 4
(1997).
72. See ROSS ABBINNETT, POLITICS OF HAPPINESS: CONNECTING THE
PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS OF HEGEL, NIETZSCHE AND DERRIDA TO THE POLITICAL
IDEOLOGIES OF HAPPINESS 22 (2013).
73. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AND LEGISLATION 18, 21, 25 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970).
74. Hume was one of the first philosophical empiricists, insisting that
philosophy, like the other natural sciences, must begin all analysis with facts from
the world, rather than with ideas. 1 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 78 (E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc. 1911) (1739).
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about the world. 75 Actions have consequences in the
empirical world, and it is to that world that we must look to
determine whether or not an action is ethical. 76 Much of
the ethical debate until this point had focused on an
evaluation of motives and intentions, judging an action as
good or bad on the basis of the thoughts behind it, rather
than based on the results it produced. 77 Furthermore,
ethics had focused on the good of the community, but
Bentham objected that the good of the community could
only mean the good of all of the individual members of the
community. 78 This turned ethical calculations into a
balancing act, totaling the consequences to each
individual member of society when determining the most
ethical action. 79 Rather than speaking in abstract terms
about the good of “mankind” or “society,” Bentham
focused on real people and the way a particular action
impacted the lives of those people. 80 Bentham insisted
that ethics must focus on all the consequences of an
action for people in the world. 81 However, this emphasis
does not yet clarify what makes an action good or bad.
The next step of Bentham’s argument was to
establish what it means to talk of the “good” of
individuals. 82
Again, Bentham disagreed with the
arguments of traditional thinkers in this discussion of
ethics. “A thing is said to promote the interest, or to be for
the interest, of an individual, when it tends to add to the
sum total of his pleasures: or, what comes to the same
thing, to diminish the sum total of his pains.”83 For
75. See BENTHAM, supra note 73, at 74.
76. See id.
77. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE MORAL LAW : GROUNDWORK OF THE
METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 64 (H.J. Paton trans., Routledge Classics 2005) (1948).
78. “The interest of the community is one of the most general expressions
that can occur in the phraseology of morals: no wonder that the meaning of it is
often lost. When it has a meaning, it is this. The community is a fictitious body,
composed of the individual persons who are considered as constituting as it were
its members. The interest of the community then is, what? – the sum of the
interests of the several members who compose it.” BENTHAM, supra note 73, at
12.
79. Id. at 12-13, 40.
80. See id. at 12.
81. See id. at 40.
82. See id. at 12, 125.
83. BENTHAM, supra note 73, at 12.
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Bentham, the first philosopher to robustly articulate the
ethics of utilitarianism, an action is deemed ethical if it
promotes pleasure and diminishes pain. 84
Bentham
ultimately equated utility with pleasure and claimed that
ethical calculations should determine the amount of
pleasure produced by an action. 85 When compared to the
philosophers of his time, who made ethical arguments with
appeals to reason, or God, or natural rights, Bentham’s
work looks radical. Grounded firmly in the world of
experience, Bentham refuses to make non-empirical
judgments about the “quality” of an interest, instead
insisting that happiness and pleasure are all just matters
of degree. 86 All pleasure is equally valuable, so more
pleasure is just better. 87
In order to understand the way in which Mill’s
utilitarian calculus differs from Bentham’s, one must first
understand what Bentham means by saying an action
increases pleasure. First of all, unlike Mill, Bentham
endorsed a theoretically consistent version of ethical
hedonism. 88 Bentham argued that all pleasure was equal,
and that ethics had nothing to say about the value of one
form of pleasure over another. 89 Bentham’s philosophical
84. See id. at 11-12.
85. Id.
86. Among even those who admire Bentham’s work, there is a concern that
he is fundamentally wrong about his position that all pleasure is the same. For
instance, “He saw an analogy where there was none. He also confused
measurements of quantity with comparisons of effects. When a man has to
choose between two alternative pleasures, one of which is mild but lasting and the
other intense but brief, he never can choose the greater, for the simple reason that
neither is the greater. What he can do, however, is to choose the one he desires
the more intensely.” PLAMENATZ, supra note 60, at 74. However, this flaw is
remedied in Mill’s version of utilitarianism. See MILL, supra note 65, at 56.
87. See PLAMENATZ, supra note 60, at 73.
88.
Hedonism,
STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
PHIL.,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hedonism/
[https://perma.cc/CJ9E-9EEB]
(published April 20, 2004 and substantially revised October 17, 2013). Again,
although he is consistent, Bentham may also be wrong. Treating all pleasure as
inherently the same ignores real differences that seem to have effects on how that
pleasure is experienced in the world. “The intensity of a pleasure cannot be
measured against its duration, nor its duration against its certainty or uncertainty,
nor this latter property against its propinquity or remoteness.” PLAMENATZ, supra
note 60, at 74.
89. Bentham refuses to categorize kinds of pleasure, and instead measures
pleasure (and pain) by variations in degree. But pleasure as such is one kind of
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account included the explication of a utilitarian calculus,
meant to analyze the rightness and wrongness of actions
with reference to the extent to which the action tended to
produce more pleasure. 90 Again, for Bentham, because
all pleasures are of equal worth, the difference between
more or less worthy actions is the degree to which the
actions produce more or less pleasure, and the degree to
which that pleasure is more or less intense. 91 Bentham
then argues that, in effect, ethics must perform a calculus
with regard to all ethical decisions, totaling up the value
(including the relative degrees of intensity) of all pleasures
and pains produced by choosing one action and
comparing the result to the pleasures and pains (again,
including the intensity of those pleasures and pains)
produced by an alternative action. 92 Comparison of the
results will then determine the correct ethical choice. 93

2. John Stuart Mill
While Mill claims to be continuing Bentham’s
utilitarianism, Mill ultimately disagrees with Bentham’s
pure hedonism. 94 Some pleasures are more valuable than
thing, capable only of differences in degree, not in kind. “By utility is meant that
property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure,
good, or happiness, (all this in the present case comes to the same thing) or (what
comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or
unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered.” BENTHAM, supra note 73,
at 12.
90. “To a person considered by himself, the value of a pleasure or pain
considered by itself, will be greater or less, according to the four following
circumstances: 1. Its intensity. 2. Its duration. 3. Its certainty or uncertainty. 4.
Its propinquity or remoteness.” Id. at 38.
91. “By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or
disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it
appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest
is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose
that happiness.” Id. at 11-12.
92. Id. at 40.
93. Id. at 11-12, 40.
94. “Like Bentham, Mill believes that pleasantness is the only ‘good-making’
property. But how valuable a pleasure is depends not only on its duration, but on
its nature.” MILL, supra note 65, at 12. “It is quite compatible with the principle of
utility to recognize the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and
more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other
things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should
be supposed to depend on quantity alone.” Id. at 56.
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others, Mill argues, but the only arbiter of the value of two
distinct pleasures, is someone who has experienced them
both. 95 Mill goes on to conclude that the quality of the socalled “higher” pleasures is so much more intense as to
make those pleasures incomparably better than the
“lower” pleasures. 96 As he famously claims, “It is better to
be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better
to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the
fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is because they
only know their own side of the question.”97 Some have
objected that this turn away from Bentham’s pure
hedonism demonstrates an inconsistency in Mill’s
theory. 98
However, the mere acknowledgement that
pleasure admits of qualitative difference does not
necessarily entail the conclusion that there is some
measure, other than pleasure, that determines value. 99
Indeed, as Mill himself notes, those who criticize the
theory of utilitarianism for valuing pleasure and who claim
that pleasure is nothing but a “base value” reveal more
about their own understanding of pleasure, than they do
about the coherence of utilitarianism. 100

95. “Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have
experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral
obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by
those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other
that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of
discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which
their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a
superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of
small account.” Id.
96. Id. at 57.
97. Id.
98. MILL, supra note 65, at 12.
99. “If a man were to say that nothing is beautiful except colour and then to
place the colours in an order of beauty, it would not follow that he was admitting
that anything but colour could be beautiful. The difference between one colour and
another is not a difference of degree, nor yet is it a difference in respect of
anything except colour. So, too, the higher and the lower pleasures, though
different in kind, may yet differ only in respect of pleasure.” Id. at 137.
100. Discussing the Epicureans response to those who alleged their belief
system as a “doctrine worthy only of swine,” Mill points out, “Epicureans have
always answered, that it is not they, but their accusers, who represent human
nature in a degrading light; since the accusation supposes human beings to be
capable of no pleasures except those of which swine are capable.” Id. at 55.
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At the center of Mill’s theory of utilitarianism, and the
element that makes utilitarianism more than merely an
ethics of self-interest, is that, when one calculates how
any particular action will maximize happiness, one must
not privilege one’s own happiness over that of any other
person. 101 All human beings have equal value when
calculating how much happiness there is in the world. 102
Therefore, even an action that threatens to impose pain on
one individual or on a group of individuals might still be
held to be ethical on a utilitarian calculus, as long as the
totality of pleasure created by the action exceeds that
pain. 103 It is this universal nature of the utilitarian calculus
that makes taxation ethically possible, since the “pain”
imposed by the government collecting the tax will be offset
by the pleasure created by the services the government
provides with the revenue. 104
Mill’s emphasis that there are higher and lower
pleasures, and that the higher pleasures are more
ethically valuable than the lower ones, serves as the basis
for thinking that Mill is concerned with more than just selfinterest. 105 Mill goes on to explain that, for example,
“justice” is nothing more than a higher pleasure that must
101. “[Impartiality] is involved in the very meaning of Utility, or the GreatestHappiness Principle. That principle is a mere form of words without rational
signification, unless one person’s happiness, supposed equal in degree (with the
proper allowance made for kind), is counted for exactly as much as another’s.” Id.
at 105.
102. “[T]he happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in
conduct, is not the agent’s own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between
his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly
impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator.” Id. at 64.
103. Mill acknowledges that, in some instances, the good of others can only
be achieved by the sacrifices of some. “Though it is only in a very imperfect state
of the world’s arrangements that anyone can best serve the happiness of others by
the absolute sacrifice of his own, yet so long as the world is in that imperfect state,
I fully acknowledge that the readiness to make such a sacrifice is the highest virtue
which can be found in man.” MILL, supra note 65, at 63.
104. Consequentialism, supra note 66. Mill discusses taxation towards the
end of Utilitarianism, primarily by criticizing non-consequentialist analyses of the
justice of taxation. MILL, supra note 65, at 102. Mill claims that the only way out of
the debate about the appropriate way to tax is with the application of utilitarian
principles. Id. Having pointed out that some theories of justice will demand equal
taxation from all, and others will require graduated tax, Mill states “[f]rom these
confusions there is no other mode of extrication than the utilitarian.” Id.
105. MILL, supra note 65, at 57.
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be included in the utilitarian calculus. 106 Justice is a term
used regularly in most discussion of ethics. 107 But Mill
argues that justice has no meaning outside of the
utilitarian calculus.
Valuing “justice,” even giving it
absolute dominance over all other values, only
demonstrates that what we call justice must be given great
worth in the utilitarian calculus. 108 Justice is nothing but a
surfeit of pleasure produced by certain actions. 109 Part of
what often gets left out of discussions of the utilitarian
calculus is Mill’s belief that, if people are, in fact, highly
moral, then they will get pleasure from helping others. 110
A world that is just, by utilitarian measures, will tend
towards equality, as those with means will experience
happiness by sharing what they have with those who have
less. 111
One consequence of Mill’s theory of utilitarianism for
theories of government and social justice generally is that
the best forms of government will be those that align the
well-being of individuals with that of society as a whole. 112
When the choices that produce the most happiness for
individuals also lead to the most happiness for all
members of society, then individuals need not engage in a
difficult moral calculus in determining the best action. 113
Instead, the choice of which action is most ethically
appropriate will be obvious. Mill believes that the power to
align these interests effectively lies with the
government. 114
[L]aws and social arrangements should place the
happiness, or (as speaking practically it may be
called) the interest, of every individual, as nearly
106. See id. at 106.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 93.
110. “[I]n a properly constituted world, the individual’s happiness will be
found in doing what is morally right.” MILL, supra note 65, at 5.
111. “The utilitarian morality does recognise in human beings the power of
sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others. It only refuses to admit
that the sacrifice is itself a good. A sacrifice which does not increase, or tend to
increase, the sum total of happiness, it considers as wasted.” Id. at 63-64.
112. Id. at 65-66.
113. Id. at 66.
114. Id. at 64.
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as possible in harmony with the interest of the
whole; and secondly, that education and opinion,
which have so vast a power over human
character, should so use that power as to
establish in the mind of every individual an
indissoluble association between his own
happiness and the good of the whole; especially
between his own happiness and the practice of
such modes of conduct, negative and positive, as
regard for the universal happiness prescribes: so
that not only he may be unable to conceive the
possibility of happiness to himself, consistently
with conduct opposed to the general good, but
also that a direct impulse to promote the general
good may be in every individual one of the
habitual motives of action, and the sentiments
connected therewith may fill a large and
prominent place in every human being’s sentient
existence. 115

That is to say, it is the task of the government to
arrange affairs so that individuals see their incentives as
aligned with the good of the whole, rather than in conflict
with that good. When members of a society understand
that their utility is increased in concert with the utility of the
rest of the world, then they are more likely to make
choices that increase total utility, and are therefore moral
choices, on utilitarian grounds.
Since the ethical discourse of his day focused
primarily on the language of justice and fairness, Mill
spends a fair amount of his text contemplating what
utilitarianism implies for notions of justice. On Mill’s
account, a strict application of utilitarian principles, where
each individual’s happiness counts the same as any
other’s, and where the higher pleasures, including those
produced by social equality and fairness are preferred
over the lower pleasures, will necessarily lead to a just
society. 116 Towards the end of Utilitarianism, Mill makes a
prescient comment about the nature of justice in society.

115. MILL, supra note 65, at 64.
116. Id. at 106.
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Observing that social norms about acceptable differences
in treatment evolve over time, Mill contemplates the
evolution of the understanding of justice in society within
the utilitarian framework. 117
Because utilitarianism
demands that each individual be able to seek the
maximization of happiness in the world, including his own
individual happiness, utilitarianism contemplates in
everyone “an equal claim to all the means of happiness,
except in so far as the inevitable conditions of human life,
and the general interest in which that of every individual is
included, sets limits to the maxim . . . .”118 Mill goes on to
note that the evolution of justice in society reflects just this
reality. 119 People have been given the freedom to pursue
their own happiness, unless and until that pursuit infringes
on others. Society regularly imposes restrictions on the
ability of certain groups or individuals to pursue their own
happiness. As society evolves, those restrictions evolve
as well, and we often identify as “unjust” what we
previously saw as merely expedient. 120 Mill emphasizes
that a focus on maximizing social utility might allow us to
avoid the kind of expediency that results in social norms

117. See id.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 106-07.
120. MILL, supra note 65, at 106.
All persons are deemed to have a right to equality of treatment,
except when some recognised social expediency requires the
reverse. And hence all social inequalities which have ceased to be
considered expedient, assume the character not of simple
inexpediency, but of injustice, and appear so tyrannical, that people
are apt to wonder how they ever could have been tolerated; forgetful
that they themselves perhaps tolerate other inequalities under an
equally mistaken notion of expediency, the correction of which would
make that which they approve seem quite as monstrous as what they
have at last learnt to condemn. The entire history of social
improvement has been a series of transitions, by which one custom
or institution after another, from being a supposed primary necessity
of social existence, has passed into the rank of an universally
stigmatized injustice and tyranny. So it has been with the distinctions
of slaves and freemen, nobles and serfs, patricians and plebeians;
and so it will be, and in part already is, with the aristocracies of
colour, race, and sex.
Id.
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we later identify as unjust. 121 The utilitarian standard
treats all individuals as equally valuable, and Mill thinks
this treatment might avoid the kind of injustice that has
evolved under other ethical theories. 122
Mill’s theory of utilitarianism creates a set of ethical
rules based on the measuring of pleasures and pains
across a society. Mill ultimately holds that there are
meaningful differences between the higher and lower
pleasures, and that among the higher pleasures are those
that tend towards equality and justice. 123 And since
motives are irrelevant, from an ethical perspective, laws
can and should create ethical behavior by mandating
happiness-producing actions. 124

B. Welfare Economics
Just as in its intellectual forebear, “utility” is the
fundamental measure of value in the welfare economic
model. 125 While “utility” is the unified concept at the
foundation of the economic calculus, welfare economists
have also taken from Mill’s utilitarianism the notion that not
all “utility” is the same. 126 This view that not all happiness
is equally valuable becomes manifest in the form of the
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. Id. at 56.
124. MILL, supra note 65, at 64.
125. As Louis Kaplow explains it, “The welfare economic approach to social
assessment . . . determines the effects of any policy under consideration on each
individual’s utility – also referred to as an individual’s well-being or welfare. Thus
. . . positive analysis entails identifying policies’ consequences for each individual.
Second, to form a social assessment, the information on everyone’s utility is
aggregated using a [social welfare function (SWF)], in particular an individualistic
SWF, indicating that social welfare is a function (only) of individuals’ utilities.”
KAPLOW , supra note 62, at 37.
126. See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus
Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001) (discussing the different perspectives of
utility in welfare economics).
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theory of declining marginal utility. 127
Economists
generally claim that it is impossible, in the abstract, to
determine what provides utility to individual people. 128 We
have no way to see inside the minds of members of
society, and doing thorough empirical research on the
happiness producing outcomes of all members of society
is impossible. However, economics does not abandon the
fundamental empiricism of the utilitarian theory. 129 We
must make judgments about utility based only on the
information available to us. Economics therefore focuses
on the “expressed preferences” of members of society in
order to determine utility. 130 Most economic theories
endorse the view that the most easily calculable
expression of preferences is the use of money. 131
Therefore, welfare economic theorists conclude that it is
reasonable to use money as a substitute for utility. 132
127. Declining marginal utility is a fundamental premise of contemporary
welfare economics, and, indeed, is considered so fundamental that is incorporated
into introductory textbooks on the subject (although it is not a premise adopted by
all economists). See, e.g., N. GREGORY MANKIW , PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS
447 (Joseph Sabatino et al. eds., 2012).
128. Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 103, 113-14 (1979).
129. See id. at 107.
130. See generally Bryan Norton, Robert Costanza, and Richard C. Bishop,
The Evolution of Preferences: Why “Sovereign” Preferences May Not Lead to
Sustainable Policies and What to Do about It, 24 Ecological Econ. 193, 201 (1998)
(“[C]laims that people do not behave according to the dictates of utility theory are
particularly troubling to economists, whose theories assume that people are
rational in the sense of having preferences that are complete and transitive and in
the sense that they choose what they most prefer.”) (internal quotations omitted).
131. “[W]e can determine what people care about by what they buy and do
not buy.” Neil H. Buchanan, The Role of Economics in Tax Scholarship, in
BEYOND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IN UNITED STATES TAX LAW 11, 21 (David A.
Brennen et al. eds., 2013).
132. See KAPLOW , supra note 62, at 359.
It is familiar to economists that well-being or utility (the terms are
used interchangeably throughout) is a broad, subjective notion, not
one limited to material pleasures, hedonistic enjoyment, or any other
a priori class of pleasures and pains. Resources, often measured in
monetary units, are means to obtain goods and services; these, in
turn, are means to generating utility, which may be derived directly
from goods or indirectly and intangibly, such as through fulfillment,
sympathetic feelings for family and friends, aesthetic enjoyment of art
or the environment, and so forth.
KAPLOW , supra note 62, at 359.
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While examining the financial choices people make in an
attempt to identify their utility preferences might give us
some insight into their individual utilitarian calculus, even
limiting utility to a monetary calculus does not allow those
seeking to apply welfare economic analysis to an issue to
get a clear universalizable result.
Individuals have
different preferences, even with regard to something as
universal as money.
Retrieving reliable empirical
information about those differing preferences is difficult, so
welfare economics makes simplifying assumptions about
the preferences of individuals. 133 The primary simplifying
assumption economists make is that everyone desires
more money (utility). 134
Therefore the action that
produces more money will typically be the better action,
according to a welfare economic analysis. 135
However, welfare economists also recognize that not
all money is equal to all people. 136 A dollar is worth much
more to the person with only fifty dollars to her name than
it is to Bill Gates. The idea that a dollar is worth more to
someone with less overall is known as declining marginal
utility. 137 “Marginal utility” is the usefulness of the last
item, in comparison to the item immediately before it. 138 If
one’s marginal utility declines, then the last item is less
useful than the second to last item. 139 This theory of the
declining marginal value of money, and its extension to a
[L]egal scholars have traditionally tried to avoid specifically defining
what constitutes utility, happiness, or well-being. Instead, legal
scholars use proxies such as liberty and money, which are thought to
influence happiness or well-being, regardless of the precise way in
which happiness or well-being is defined. To that end, utilitarianism
as traditionally applied in tax policy uses income or wealth as a proxy
for utility and assumes the declining marginal utility thereof . . . .
Fleischer, supra note 16, at 1505 (footnotes omitted). “[I]t may not be possible to
measure utility at all.” Sarah B. Lawsky, On the Edge: Declining Marginal Utility
and Tax Policy, 95 MINN. L. REV. 904, 909 (2011).
133. See Lawsky, supra note 132, at 905.
134. See Posner, supra note 128, at 119.
135. Id.
136. MANKIW , supra note 127.
137. See Lawsky, supra note 132, at 915.
138. Id.
139. Id. “[D]eclining marginal utility of income means each dollar is worth
less than the dollar before. (‘Marginal’ utility of income refers, of course, to the
utility of the dollar ‘at the margin,’ that is, the last dollar.)” Id.
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theory of declining marginal utility more broadly, is
generally accepted by welfare economists. 140 Declining
marginal utility allows economic theory to incorporate a
social welfare component by arguing that the allocation of
goods between higher and lower income members of
society can include an estimation of the value of those
goods to each potential recipient. 141 If the theory of
declining marginal utility indicates that a particular good
will be less valuable to the higher income (or higher
wealth) individual, then the utilitarian goal can be met by
allocating that good to the lower income (or lower wealth)
individual. 142 This theory of declining marginal utility
justifies progressive taxation, of both the income and
wealth transfer variety. 143 Because the last dollar earned
by the wealthier individual provides little value to her, the
government can take that dollar, in the form of a tax, and
transfer it to a less wealthy individual, usually in the form
of services, but sometimes in the form of a direct financial
transfer, as in the refundable income tax credits aimed at
low income taxpayers. 144

C. Classical Utilitarianism Is Not Welfare Economics
As should now be clear, there are significant
differences between classical utilitarianism and its
modern-day interpretation in welfare economics. In an
attempt to simplify the utilitarian calculus and make it
useful in determining real-world policies, including tax
policies, welfare economics has left behind Mill’s view that
higher pleasures, like the pleasures of justice and equality,
140. “The assumption of declining marginal utility of income – that the next
dollar a person receives is “worth less” to a wealthy person than a poor person –
has been crucial in tax scholarship over the last sixty or so years, as optimal tax
theory and welfarism have become important ways that many in the legal academy
evaluate tax policy.” Id. at 904.
141. See MANKIW , supra note 127.
142. See Lawsky, supra note 132, at 917.
143. See id.
144. For an explanation and discussion of the Earned Income Tax Credit,
which is the largest direct transfer to low-income taxpayers through the Federal
Income Tax, see generally Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Who’s Afraid of Redistribution? An
Analysis of the Earned Income Tax Credit 74 MO. L. REV. 251 (2009) (presenting
the history of the EITC through its current form, reviewing its critics, and proposing
adjustments).
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must be valued more highly in determining the correct
course of action. 145 While more sophisticated versions of
welfare economics include a “social welfare function” that
can incorporate the values of justice and equality as
values a society holds, 146 most welfare economists do not
endorse the view held by Mill that those values are, in fact,
more valuable than other values. 147 This resistance to
ranking preferences, outside of the ranking permitted by
applying a theory of declining marginal utility, makes it
harder to justify equality-producing laws on a welfare
economic basis. 148
What makes Millian utilitarianism a more robust
ethical theory than a simple “greatest good for the greatest
number” arithmetic calculation is that Mill believed that the
higher pleasures received additional weight in that ethical
Because not all pleasures are alike,
calculation. 149
determining the correct utilitarian outcome requires not
just determining the raw number of pleasures produced by
an action, nor even comparing the intensity and duration
of those pleasures, as Bentham would claim. 150 Mill’s
theory introduces the idea that pleasures of a higher order
must be preferred above the lower pleasures. 151 And
included in those higher pleasures are the social goods we
identify as justice and equality. 152
Because these
pleasures are of such a greater magnitude than the lower
145. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114
HARV. L. REV. 961, 979-80 (2001).
146. For an explanation of the role of the social welfare function, see
KAPLOW , supra note 62.
147. See Guido Calabresi, Of Tastes and Values, 16 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
313, 316 (2014).
148. See Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited, 2 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 85, 88 (1985).
149. See MILL, supra note 65, at 56.
150.
See id.; Jeremy Bentham, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bentham/
[https://perma.cc/M83U-K4BJ]
(published March 17, 2015) (describing Bentham’s “felicific calculus,” which “[t]o an
individual the value of a pain or pleasure will be more or less according to its
intensity, duration, . . .”) (internal quotations omitted).
151. See MILL, supra note 65, at 59.
152. Mill’s Moral and Political Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ mill-moral-political/ [https://perma.cc/K4SR-XNTQ]
(published October 9, 2007 and substantially revised August 22, 2014) (“Justice
implies something which it is not only right to do, and wrong not to do, but which
some individual person can claim from us as a matter of right.”).
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pleasure of satisfying self-interest, much social policy and
law could be designed to achieve the higher pleasures of
justice and equality. While the use of the social welfare
function in welfare economics goes some way towards
allowing the utilitarian calculus to prefer certain kinds of
pleasure (or utility) over others, welfare economics does
not go so far as to say that some forms of utility are by
their very nature to be preferred over others. 153
Of course, one objection to Millian utilitarianism is that
Mill claims that some pleasures are greater and more
valuable than others without providing any criteria by
which to determine which pleasures those are. 154 His
elitist claim that Socrates and his ilk are better judges than
the lowly pig of what true pleasure is gives us some insight
into Mill’s beliefs regarding the higher and lower
pleasures, but very little information about how the
utilitarian calculus ought to be applied in society. 155
Welfare economics responds by leaving this element of
Mill’s theory out of its take-up of utilitarianism, 156 but by
leaving this element behind, welfare economics loses
some of the ethical force of Mill’s original theory. There
may be legitimate objections to the argument that some
pleasures are more meaningful and valuable than others,
but abandoning that portion of the theory without replacing
it with another element risks making the theory
unintelligible.

IV. WHAT DOES UTILITARIANISM SAY ABOUT
WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION?
At the heart of Mill’s ethical argument is a belief that
the moral actor experiences pleasure, and therefore
makes ethical choices, by performing the action that
promotes the good of the entire community, rather than

153. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 145, at 979-80.
154. See Mill’s Moral and Political Philosophy, supra note 152 (“[E]ven if we
can distinguish higher and lower pleasures, according to their causes, it remains
unclear how the hedonist is to explain how higher pleasures are inherently more
pleasurable.”).
155. See MILL, supra note 65, at 57.
156. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 145, at 979-80.
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based solely on his own self-interest. 157 At first glance this
might seem to indicate that a moral society does not need
wealth transfer taxation, since individuals acting in
accordance with utilitarian ethical theory will make choices
about the distribution of their wealth that will tend towards
an increase in the happiness of the entire society. The
natural goals of all individuals to maximize their own utility
will lead them to redistribute their own wealth, making
direct transfers to those members of society who have
less, until society becomes more or less equal. With this
sort of self-motivated redistribution, one of the central
functions of taxation would be eliminated. 158 However,
Mill does not expect that all individuals will share the
appropriate utilitarian motivation from the outset. 159 We
are, as Mill notes, becoming more ethical, and since
utilitarianism is an empirical approach, more information
about the world results in more and more ethical
behavior. 160 But until individuals become sufficiently
aware of their own utility and how best to maximize
happiness (by recognizing that a more equal society
promotes the most happiness, says Mill), we may need
157. MILL, supra note 65, at 64.
[U]tility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should
place the happiness, or (as speaking practically it may be called) the
interest, of every individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with the
interest of the whole; and secondly, that education and opinion,
which have so vast a power over human character, should so use
that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an
indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of
the whole . . . so that not only he may be unable to conceive the
possibility of happiness to himself, consistently with conduct opposed
to the general good, but also that a direct impulse to promote the
general good may be in every individual one of the habitual motives
of action, and the sentiments connected therewith may fill a large and
prominent place in every human being’s sentient existence.
Id.
158. Federal tax performs several functions, many of which could not be
achieved merely by relying on self-motivated redistribution, such as military
spending, environmental and investment regulation, or foreign policy. However,
one motivation for taxation, and especially for progressive taxation (including the
estate tax) and spending programs aimed at the least well-off members of society,
is the goal of having a more equitable distribution of wealth in society. See TAX
PROGRESSIVITY AND INCOME INEQUALITY 2-3 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1994).
159. See MILL, supra note 65, at 70.
160. See id.
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laws that encourage us to act in a way that is most likely to
produce that happiness.
And importantly, Mill’s
consequentialist ethics is unconcerned with motives,
counting as ethical an action that increases overall
happiness, whether or not that action is motivated by a
desire on the part of the actor to act ethically. 161
Consequentialist ethical theories concern themselves only
with the result of an action, such that “ethical intentions”
count for little to nothing in consequentialist theories. 162
Mill’s utilitarian ethics counts as ethical any action that
does, in fact, increase utility/happiness, whether or not the
intention of the actor is to increase utility/happiness. 163
Therefore, if it were demonstrated that any particular
government plan would increase overall happiness, then
analyzing that plan from the utilitarian perspective would
lead to an endorsement of that plan. For purposes of this
article, the question to be considered is whether or not
adopting utilitarianism would lead to the endorsement of a
system of wealth transfer taxation.
If a heavily
redistributive wealth transfer taxation did, in fact, increase
overall happiness, then a utilitarian analysis would
endorse that tax.
In determining whether or not utilitarianism leads to
the conclusion that wealth transfer taxation is ethically
justified, one must consider another essential element of
Mill’s classical utilitarian calculus—the fact that not all
pleasures are equally valuable. Classical utilitarianism is

161.

See MILL, supra note 65, at 65.

[Critics of utilitarianism] say it is exacting too much to require that
people shall always act from the inducement of promoting the
general interests of society. But this is to mistake the very meaning
of a standard of morals, and to confound the rule of action with the
motive of it. It is the business of ethics to tell us what are our duties,
or by what test we may know them; but no system of ethics requires
that the sole motive of all we do shall be a feeling of duty; on the
contrary, ninety-nine hundreths of all our actions are done from other
motives, and rightly so done, if the rule of duty does not condemn
them. [T]he motive has nothing to do with the morality of the
action . . . .
Id.
162. Id. at 14.
163. Id. at 65.
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still primarily empirical, so performing a utilitarian calculus
does, to a certain extent, depend upon empirical evidence
of the utility provided in various scenarios. Empirical
research on the effects of various wealth transfer tax
schemes is outside of the scope of this project. Despite
that, there is evidence examining the general well-being of
societies with more or less equitable distributions of
wealth. 164
Sophisticated welfare economics research
does include these insights in determining the utility of
particular actions. 165 Utilitarianism would require this
weighing of pleasures as well. Because some pleasures
are higher than others, the utilitarian calculus must weight
those particular sources of pleasure more heavily.
Therefore, evaluations of wealth transfer taxation that
consider only the utility of the decedent/donor or the heir,
or evaluations that consider those utilities in comparison
with the utility of a more equitable society, but give all
those estimations of utility equal weight, will miss the point
of classical utilitarianism. Mill claimed that the quality of
higher pleasures like justice and equality were so intense
as to make them infinitely more valuable than any other
source of pleasure. 166
Since robust utilitarianism
evaluates pleasures based not merely on their intensity or
duration, but also on the quality of the pleasure, it does not
go too far to say that utilitarianism is consistent with robust
redistribution. While this redistribution could be achieved
through other methods of taxation, using wealth transfer
taxation to effect that redistribution targets the tax at
combating the concentration of wealth in a way that
income taxation does not. 167
While it seems evident that utilitarianism is consistent
with and, indeed, might even demand heavily redistributive
taxation, without more empirical evidence regarding the
effect of different forms of taxation on the utility of those
164. Mill himself, writing 150 years ago, believed society was poised to wipe
out poverty and the suffering it caused. “Poverty, in any sense implying suffering,
may be completely extinguished by the wisdom of society, combined with the good
sense and providence of individuals.” Id. at 62.
165. See James R. Repetti, Should We Tax the Gratuitous Transfer of
Wealth? An Introduction, 57 B.C. L. REV. 815, 817-18 (2016).
166. See MILL, supra note 65, at 98.
167. See Moran, supra note 28, at 329.
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involved, it is difficult to say what form that redistributive
taxation should take. There are reasons to believe that
wealth transfer taxation does more in a more direct way to
combat unequal wealth distributions than do other forms of
tax, such as income or consumption taxes. However,
even within the category of wealth transfer taxation there
are many possible options for organizing the tax. An
inheritance or accessions tax would impose a tax on the
recipient of the transfer, which is likely the best way to
achieve more equality of outcome, especially if the
revenue raised from the tax is then used to increase
opportunities available to the least well-off members of
society. 168 However, even an estate and gift tax system
like the one currently in place in the United States—if the
exemption levels were reduced, if the rates were
increased, and if the valuations were more robustly
enforced—could increase utility and happiness by
decreasing the concentration of wealth and increasing
social justice. Achieving this utilitarian ethical result would
depend on using the revenue raised through the estate
and gift taxes to achieve a more equitable society, which
would balance the cost of any pain produced by the
imposition of the tax. 169

168. For a discussion of the role of inheritance taxation in increasing equality
of opportunity, see Bird-Pollan, supra text accompanying note 6. For a discussion
of the use of an accessions tax to combat the intergenerational transfer of political
power, see generally Fleischer, Divide and Conquer: Using an Accessions Tax to
Combat Dynastic Wealth Transfers, 57 B.C. L. REV. 913 (2016), proposing that an
accessions tax is superior to other options for taxing wealth transfers in achieving
the goal of minimizing dynastic wealth transfers.
169. A utilitarian may be especially drawn to the use of an estate tax to
achieve these redistributive goals, since the tax is only collected after the death of
the taxpayer. Therefore, the pain suffered by that taxpayer is only the pain of the
anticipation of paying the tax, rather than the actual pain or unhappiness
experienced by paying the tax. Of course, the heir to the wealth may feel some
unhappiness knowing that her inheritance is smaller, due to the burden of the tax,
but that pain might also be mitigated by the knowledge that the legal system allows
the inheritance to proceed, thereby enriching the heir with the wealth of the
decedent. See generally Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Why Tax Wealth Transfers: A
Philosophical Analysis, 57 B.C. L. REV. 859 (2016) (applying philosophical analysis
to the question of wealth transfer taxation and proposing that “a robust system of
wealth transfer taxation is best suited to combat . . . inequality in the twenty-first
century” and that “wealth transfer taxation is consistent with most philosophical
belief systems”).
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V. CONCLUSION
This article has examined the current state of wealth
transfer taxation in the United States and applied the
utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill to an analysis of wealth
transfer taxation more broadly. This utilitarian analysis is
an important step in the tax policy debate, as many U.S.
taxpayer/voters, as well as numerous tax policy scholars,
embrace utilitarianism as a philosophical approach. A
utilitarian analysis that demonstrates that robust wealth
transfer taxation is endorsed by a theoretically consistent
utilitarian philosophy moves the conversation about the
future of the estate tax forward. Much political debate
about the estate and gift tax system is mired in convoluted
and
confused
versions
of
poor
philosophical
argumentation. This article clarifies the utilitarian view,
and carefully applies that view to the arguments around
wealth transfer taxation.
Because the utilitarian calculus espoused by Mill
permits a ranking of pleasures, valuing “higher” pleasures
more than “lower” pleasures, and because equality and
justice are higher pleasures on Mill’s analysis, taxation
that redistributes wealth in order to create a more equal
society will be judged ethical under Mill’s utilitarianism.
While this redistribution need not necessarily come in the
form of wealth transfer taxation, under the current system
of taxation in the United States, the taxation of wealth
transfers is the most heavily redistributive tax, collecting
tax only from the wealthiest members of society, and,
primarily, only after they have died. While a utilitarian
evaluation of the current federal wealth transfer taxes
must consider the loss of utility felt by the individual
subject to the tax, and by any heir who receives a smaller
inheritance as a result of the tax, those will be lower pains,
insufficient to offset the higher pleasure of increased social
equality.

